00100	.SEC A SYMBOL-PROCESSING THEORY OF THE PARANOID MODE
00200	
00300	           
00400	.SS Hypotheses and Presuppositions
00500	
00600		A theory consists of a conjunction of  hypotheses  (main  and
00700	subsidiary),  and  statements  of  initial conditions. Underlying the
00800	theory are numerous  other  assumptions  and  presuppositions.    The
00900	theory  of  the  paranoid  mode to be described posits a structure or
01000	organization of interacting symbolic procedures. These procedures and
01100	their  interactions  are  supplemented  in  the theory by a number of
01200	auxiliary assumptions and tacit presuppositions some of which will be
01300	described as the story unfolds.
01400	
01500	
01600		In explaining human symbolic conduct I presuppose a schema of
01700	intentionalistic action and non-action which can be described in  the
01800	form of a practical inference:
01900		AN AGENT A WANTS SITUATION S TO OBTAIN
02000		A BELIEVES THAT IN ORDER FOR S TO OBTAIN, A MUST DO X
02100		THEREFORE A PLANS, TRIES OR PROCEEDS TO DO X
02200	.END
02300	An agent is taken here to be human. To do means to  produce,  prevent
02400	or  allow  something  to happen. The agent's power to do X (intrinsic
02500	and extrinsic enabling conditions) is assumed.   X  can  be  multiple
02600	sequential  or  concurrent  actions  and includes mental action (e.g.
02700	deciding)  as  well  as  physical  action(e.g.talking).  It  is  also
02800	presupposed  in  this  action-schema  that  ,  in doing X, A receives
02900	feedback as to whether S is coming about, i.e.    whether doing X  is
03000	successful  or  not  in obtaining S.  Thus an intention is defined to
03100	consist of a wish, a belief, and an action which may be carried  out,
03200	interrupted and diverted or simply planned.
03300		The  major processes here posited to govern the paranoid mode
03400	involve  an  organization  of   symbol-manipulating   procedures   or
03500	strategies at one level executed by an interpreter at a higher level.
03600	A serial execution of these  strategies  is  assumed  to  begin  with
03700	"consciencing"  procedures  which judge an action, desire or state of
03800	the self to be wrong or defective according to criteria  of  positive
03900	and   negative  sanctioning  beliefs.     A  censuring  process  then
04000	attempts to assign blame to an agent for the wrong.
04100		It is assumed that next the interpreter attempts a simulation
04200	of assigning blame to the self.  If the self were  to  accept  blame,
04300	the  trial simulation detects an affect-signal of shame warning of an
04400	eventual  undergoing  of  humiliation   for   personal   failure   or
04500	imperfection.     The  detection  in  the  simulation  serves  as  an
04600	anticipatory warning not to actually execute this procedure since  it
04700	will result in the painful re-experiencing of a negative affect-state
04800	of humiliation.    An alternative  strategy  of  assigning  blame  to
04900	others  is  next  simulated  and  found  not to eventuate warnings of
05000	humiliation. Hence it is executed.  It operates to repudiate that the
05100	self  is  to  blame  for  a wrong and to ascribe blame to other human
05200	agents.  Now it is not the self who is responsible for a wrong but it
05300	is that the self is wronged by others.
05400		These postulated strategies have  the  consequence  of  being
05500	inefficient  and  only  partially  effective  in  the  prevention  of
05600	humiliation.   They  can  misfire  since  the  output  counteractions
05700	generated may result in the self repeatedly undergoing criticisms and
05800	condemnations from others, exposing the self to incremental shame and
05900	humiliation.      Hostile,   antagonistic   and  belittling  behavior
06000	provokes and alienates others.  The locus of censure is shifted  from
06100	the  self  to  others  but the countering actions designed to contend
06200	with others, and redress the wrongs, have  paradoxical  repercussions
06300	tending   to  amplify  rather  than  reduce  the  very  states  these
06400	strategies are attempting to forestall and ward off.
06500	
06600		The   above-sketched  presuppositions  are  not  embodied  as
06700	procedures  in  the  model-version  to  be  described.  The   model's
06800	strategies  begin  with  a  scan  of  the  input  searching first for
06900	malevolence on the part of  the  interviewer.    The  definitions  of
07000	malevolence  are  given  in  Fig.    1.     Using this classification
07100	scheme, the  model  attempts  identify  the  input  as  malevolent  ,
07200	benevolent or neutral. If the input strategies succeed in recognizing
07300	malevolence, increases in negative affect-states of fear,  anger  and
07400	mistrust  occur  and  output strategies are executed in an attempt to
07500	reduce the other's malevolent effects.  If benevolence is detected in
07600	the  input, negative affect states decrease and an attempt is made to
07700	tell a " story" seeking self-affirmation and self-  vindication  from
07800	the  other.  If  the  input  is deemed neutral, a neutral nonparanoid
07900	response is given. The  output  actions  of  the  paranoid  mode  are
08000	grouped  into  reducing  persecution by retribution or by withdrawal.
08100	Retribution is intended to drive the other  away  whereas  withdrawal
08200	removes the self from the sphere of the malevolent other.
08300		The description just offered attempts to summarize informally
08400	a    series   of   posited   operations   in   an   organization   of
08500	symbol-processing procedures.    The details of these procedures  and
08600	their  interactions  will be made explicit when the central processes
08700	of the model are described (see p ).
08800		The  theory  is  circumscribed in that it attempts to explain
08900	only certain symbolic phenomena of a particular type of  episode,i.e.
09000	an  interview.  It  does not attempt to explain, for example, why the
09100	censuring process condemns particular actions or states as wrongs nor
09200	how  any  of  these  procedures  develop  over  time  in  a  person's
09300	paranoidogenic socialization experience.    Thus it does not  provide
09400	an  ontogenetic  explanation  of  how  an  organization  of processes
09500	evolved and grew to be  the  way  it  is.     The  model  is  further
09600	circumscribed  in  that  it  offers  an  explanation  only of how the
09700	organization  operates  in  the  ethogenesis  of  symbolic   behavior
09800	occuring in the present in a psychiatric interview.
09900		Some evidence bearing on the posited processes  will  now  be
10000	discussed.  Evidential support for processes which attempt to contend
10100	with a malevolent other comes from clinical observations  of  normal,
10200	neurotic   and   psychotic  paranoias.   The  agent  may  report  his
10300	self-monitoring directly to an  observer  commenting  that  his,  for
10400	example,  hostile  remarks  are  intended to retaliate for a believed
10500	wrong at the hands of the other. 
10600		The process of scanning for malevolence has both clinical and
10700	experimental  evidence in its behalf.    Clinicians are familiar with
10800	the darting eye-movements of psychotic paranoids. Patients themselves
10900	report  their  hypervigilance  as  intended  to   detect   signs   of
11000	malevolence.    Silverman  (1964)  and  Venables (1964) have reported
11100	experiments indicating that paranoid schizophrenics more  extensively
11200	scan their visual fields and have a greater breadth of attention than
11300	other schizophrenic patients.
11400		In considering the  presuppositions  of  censure  and  blame,
11500	direct  evidence  is  hard  to  come  by  and  hence  such  auxiliary
11600	assumtions are on shakier ground.  Since  antiquity  it  has  been  a
11700	common  observation  that  paranoids tend to accuse others of actions
11800	and states which  hold  true  for  themselves  according  an  outside
11900	observer.   In  a  classic  paranoid  clash of 300 years ago, Newton,
12000	citing a strategy he was familiar with (only in others,  of  course),
12100	said  about Leibniz: "he himself is guilty of what he complains of in
12200	others"(Manuel, 1968).     A process  of  ascription  has  also  been
12300	offered  to  account  for  the particular selectivity involved in the
12400	hypersensitivity to criticism.      That is, why does a  man  believe
12500	others  will  ridicule  him  about his appearance unless some part of
12600	himself believes his appearance to be defective.
12700		The  obscurity  of the relation between what the self expects
12800	as malevolence and the self's own properties is well  illustrated  in
12900	hypotheses  which  have  attempted  to explain the paranoid mode as a
13000	consequence  of  homosexual  conflict. It has long been observed that
13100	some (not all) paranoid patients are excessively concerned  with  the
13200	topic  of  homosexuality.    Several studies of hospitalized paranoid
13300	schizophrenics show them to be  preoccupied  with  homosexuality  far
13400	more than the nonpsychotic controls.(See Klaf and Davis ,1960).  Such
13500	evidence may be interpreted as  having  generative  implications  for
13600	some   patients.   If  homosexual  interests  are  evaluated  by  the
13700	censuring process as wrong, then the ethogenesis of the paranoid mode
13800	on  these  grounds  becomes  plausible  as  a  limited case in a more
13900	general  theory  of  forestalling  humiliation.  There  is   also   a
14000	nonnegligible   probablity   that  an  agent,  doubtful  of  his  own
14100	sexuality, might expect to be accused of homosexuality in a community
14200	which  censures homosexuality. In such a community homosexuals trying
14300	to "pass" are of necessity suspicious since like the spy  in  hostile
14400	territory, they must be on guard against stigmatizing detection.
14500		It is obvious that self-censuring processes contribute to the
14600	regulation of human conduct. But are  distortions  of  self-censuring
14700	and  blaming  processes  the  ontogenetic  core of the paranoid mode?
14800	Heilbrun and Norbert (1971) have shown that  paranoid  schizophrenics
14900	are  more sensitive to maternal censure as measured by the disruption
15000	of a cognitive task by a tape-recording of  a  mother  censuring  her
15100	son. Further experimental evidence is needed along these lines.
15200		To embody the theory more comprehensively, the model might be
15300	extended in two ways. First, it could be made more dynamic over time.
15400	The model-version described here changes only over the  course  of  a
15500	single  interview.   To  explore  how  changes  can  be brought about
15600	through external symbolic input, the model should  have  capabilities
15700	for  self-modification  over  longer  periods  of  time  in  which it
15800	interacts with a number of interviewers. Such capacities  would  also
15900	allow  the  model  to  make retrospective misinterpretations, namely,
16000	reinterpreting old input as  malevolent  although  it  was  initially
16100	deemed as benevolent or neutral. A further use of more dynamic models
16200	could be to explore the ontogenesis of the paranoid  mode,  that  is,
16300	how   a   nonparanoid   symbolic   system  becomes  paranoid  through
16400	socializing interactions.
16500		An  extension  of  the  theory  would involve the addition of
16600	hypotheses   to   account   for   properties   such   as   arrogance,
16700	contemptuousness,  and grandeur which are often found associated with
16800	malevolence convictions.   Implementation and  integration  of  these
16900	hypotheses   in  the  model  would  complexify  it  to  increase  its
17000	comphrehensiveness and scope by extending its repertoire of ethogenic
17100	powers.   In  widening  the  scope  of  a  simulation one attempts to
17200	increase its explanatory power in covering a greater range of  facts.
17300	Naturally   accuracy  rather  than  range  is  the  more  fundamental
17400	desideratum.
17500	
17600	.SS Initial Conditions
17700		When  a  theory  is  embodied  in a concrete operating model,
17800	representations of lawlike generalizations (in  this  case,  tendency
17900	statements) are combined with representations of singular conditions,
18000	usually termed "initial conditions".   In constructing  a  simulation
18100	one can attempt to reproduce the behavior of an actual individual who
18200	is a member of some well-defined class such as  `paranoid'.   Another
18300	approach, which we adopted, is to construct a hypothetical individual
18400	whose symbolic behavior will produce characteristic effects on expert
18500	judges  leading  him  to  be  placed  in  the  class `paranoid'.  The
18600	singular  statements  describing  the  initial  conditions   of   our
18700	hypothetical individual follow.
18800		He is a 28 year old single Protestant male  who  works  as  a
18900	stockclerk at Sears, a large department store. He has no siblings and
19000	lives alone, seldom seeing his parents. He  is  sensitive  about  his
19100	parents,  his  religion  and  about  sex.  His  hobby  is gambling on
19200	horseracing, both at tracks and through bookies. A few months ago  he
19300	became  involved  in  a  severe  quarrel  with a bookie, claiming the
19400	bookie did not pay off a bet. After the quarrel, it occurred  to  him
19500	that  bookies  pay  protection to the underworld and that this bookie
19600	might gain revenge by having him injured or killed by the  Mafia.  He
19700	is eager to tell his story and to get help in protecting him from the
19800	underworld. He is willing to answer questions  about  non-  sensitive
19900	areas  of his life and offers hints about his delusional system in an
20000	attempt to feel out the interviewer's attitude towards him.
20100		Because communication with  the  model  takes  place  in  the
20200	context  of  a  psychiatric interview using unrestricted English, the
20300	first operations of the model involve the recognition of  expressions
20400	characteristic of conversational language.